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DEFINITIONS 
 
Gross Domestic Product 
The measure of an economy being the total market values of goods and 
services produced by workers and capital within a nation's borders during a 
given period (usually 1 year). 
 
Key Performance Indicators 
Measures developed under a performance management regime to indicate 
how well specified performance targets are being realised.  
 
Logistics Cost 
The cost associated with the transportation of goods such as road levies, toll 
fees and labour costs.   
 
Privatisation 
 Privatisation is described as: 
- the sale of a public corporation to the private sector in full, and  
- the handing over of a public sector activity to the private sector 
which means government withdraws completely from that activity. 
 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) can be described as a more or less 
sustainable co-operation between public and private actors in which joint 
products and/or services are developed and in which risks, costs and profits 
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Restructuring 
With reference to public corporations, restructuring relates to substantial 
changes that affects ownership, accountability, function and location in the 
public sector. This relates to joint ventures, strategic alliances, rules on 
sharing running costs and financing between the public and private sector. 
 
State-owned enterprises 
Such enterprises are also referred to as public enterprises or para-statals 
where the state is the main or sole shareholder. 
 
Transport costs 




















            8
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1 A Generic Model of PPP 
Figure 1.2  A Generic PPP Structure 
Figure 1.3 Monthly offences levied against freight vehicles in 2003 
Figure 1.4 Weight related offences levied against freight vehicles in 2003 
Figure 1.5 Monthly offences against freight vehicles in 2008 





LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1 Comparison statistics adapted from KZN Transport Annual Report  
  2003 
Table 1.2 Comparative totals for 2003 














            9
ABSTRACT 
 
Road and rail are the predominant means of freight transport in South Africa and 
generally contribute to approximately 99% of all logistics costs. While there exists 
a solid infrastructure of rail and road transportation, and with the latter being a 
cheaper option, the former is still the most preferred mode. This places 
tremendous pressure on South Africa’s rapidly deteriorating roads network. 
Unfortunately the downside to this popularity is the enormous costs incurred in 
repairing the roads and the principal wrongdoers are the commercial carriers, 
especially heavy vehicles. The problem is exacerbated by overloaded vehicles 
intending to maximise profits. Law enforcement of this particular problem in the 
Durban Metropolitan region has been ineffective due to a lack of skilled 
personnel and proper equipment. A joint venture in the form of a public-private 
partnership (PPP) between the Durban Metropolitan Police Service and the 
Vululeka-TMT Consortium was created to combat this problem. There are 
various benefits in general where PPPs exist, such as private sector efficiencies, 
innovation and specialisation. However endemic to this PPP was the addition of 
accountability resulting in increased productivity and a ‘watchdog’ situation that 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalisation and its concomitant economic reform and transformational force 
have compelled many countries around the world to rethink and revise their 
management approaches. South Africa (SA) is no exception. The constitutional 
change that led to the advent of democracy in 1994 directly impacted the public 
sector and led to the redefinition of public management with respect to service 
delivery, administrative functioning and reprioritisation of the strategic intent 
(Kroukamp, 2004: 17). The new government was faced with a huge debt and 
high deficits caused by the previous regime. This dilemma also included the 
servicing of a large all-inclusive population, albeit with limited resources driven by 
the growing demand for increased services and improvement in value and 
efficiency, against the certainty of financial and managerial constraints faced by 
all spheres of government (www.mbendi.co.za). 
 
Since coming into power, the government of national unity pursued a social-
welfare influenced policy known as the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP). Amongst other things, this policy provides for the 
restructuring of state assets, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Around 
this time, the first sign of a pervasive globalisation wave was starting to affect the 
economy. In 1996, government adopted the globalisation-friendly Growth, 
Economic, and Redistribution (GEAR) policy to run concurrently with the RDP. A 
trimming-down exercise had become paramount. A slimmer, more effective 
government would be able to divert its much required but scarce resources 
toward areas that necessitated a greater need. 
 
The strategy of privatising or restructuring of public sector departments became 
an issue of national concern and not without controversy. While the critics, 
including governments alliance partner the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), called it 
privatisation, government insisted that their aim was to form public-private 
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partnerships (PPP) with the private sector by restructuring certain state-owned 
assets. Government would either sell off part of its assets to a private entity while 
remaining the major shareholder in the partnership, or sell the entire entity to the 
private sector. This would result in greater efficiency levels, equitable services of 
acceptable quality; fair pricing structures, injection of higher skills, technology 
and finances, and a more productive workforce.  
 
Being a new government had its limitations. Economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness in government institutions needed re-dress. Wastage of scarce 
resources would inevitably place undue strain on a newly-restructured economy 
being managed by a government still in its infancy. A redefined and politicised 
stakeholder base consisting of its citizens, public servants, non-governmental 
groups and elected representatives, added a new dimension and increased 
expectations. Key issues that therefore needed consideration were good 
governance,  efficiency, consumer protection, stakeholder involvement, proper 
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2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF CASE STUDY 
 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) is the most populous province in South Africa. It is home to 
over 9 million people, accounting for 21% of South Africa’s population. In terms 
of South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), KZN generated 15% of total 
output in 2001 and rates as the second largest contributor to South Africa’s GDP 
together with the Western Cape, but is well below the leading province, Gauteng, 
which accounts for 40% of South Africa’s GDP. Being southern Africa’s trade 
gateway to the world, its economic performance has been impressive in the post-
1994 period, with growth rates above the national level. Given its coastal location 
and resource endowments, it is home to South Africa’s most important logistics 
platform for trade (Altman, 2002: 21). 
 
The growth in transport and communication services especially is related to the 
dominance of logistics services in KZN, particularly around its two large ports; 
Durban and Richards Bay. The growth of this sector is largely attributed to the 
higher volumes of trade as a consequence of trade liberalisation. For example, 
exports from the manufacturing sector have increased from approximately R20-
billion in 1993 to nearly R45-billion in 2001 (DTI, 2002: 45). 
 
Road and rail are the predominant means of freight transport in South Africa and 
generally contribute to approximately 99% of all logistics costs (King & Ittmann, 
2009: 24). While there exists a solid infrastructure of rail, and road transportation, 
the latter is the most preferred mode. This preferred mode places tremendous 
pressure on South Africa’s roads network. Rail transportation is comparatively 
cheaper than road; however, additional costs incurred include interim storage 
fees, transportation costs from the rail storage area to the actual destination, and 
invariably, time delays. Rail transportation also takes longer to transport an 
article from point of departure to point of destination than its road counterpart. 
Additional risks include in-transit theft, and higher incidence of damage to goods.  
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The resultant impact on transport costs are factors such as logistics costs and 
inventory carrying costs, the cost of storing goods in order to satisfy demand. 
One of the contributors to increased inventory costs is the long transport 
distances in South Africa, which not only lead to higher than normal transport 
costs but also add to the time that inventory is delayed.  
 
Another indirect cost to consider is vehicle maintenance. The potential effects 
that worsening road conditions can have on the broader transport costs are 
enormous; these include the vehicles tyres, suspension and mechanical 
systems. 
 
Road maintenance costs increases as the volume of heavy vehicles increase. 
Damage to the road surface is further heightened by increased overloading. Not 
all of the offenders can be prosecuted due to enforcement limitations such as 
fewer police personnel on duty, not enough vehicles, and infrastructure such as 
equipment being unavailable.  
 
Damaged roads in turn affect other road users and all of the above costs 
invariably increase the cost of goods or service provision, which ultimately affects 
the municipal customer.  
 
Another factor for consideration is the economy. In South Africa, approximately 
10 000 lives are lost annually due to road accidents, costing the country’s 
economy an estimated R13.5 billion per annum. Not only do excessively loaded 
vehicles pose an increased safety risk on the road, they also raise the rate of 
deterioration of the road infrastructure and increase road maintenance costs, 
which in turn makes many of the roads dangerous for travel by other road users 
(CSIR, 2005: i).    
 
Overloading also results in unjust competition between those operators that 
overload and those that function within the legal limits. The annual destruction to 
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the network of provincial and national roads caused by illegal loading was 
estimated in 1995 to be R450 million per annum. At today’s prices, this figure 
would be between R700 and R800 million per annum. However, this figure is 
now estimated to be far too low, as recent studies have shown that the South 
African heavy vehicle fleet has transformed over the past few years and now 
consists of an increased proportion of high payload vehicles, than in the past. In 
general, road conditions have declined to the extent that minimum overloading 
will still result in costly repairs. Overload management strategies are enforced by 
road and traffic law enforcement institutions around the country to overcome this 
serious economic dilemma. This can be quite costly and such strategies and 





















            15 
3. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK REGULATING PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs) 
 
An inter-developmental task team, appointed by the South African cabinet in April 
1997, was mandated to develop policies, legislation and institutional reforms that 
will facilitate an environment within which PPPs can operate and flourish. 
Pioneering PPP projects were undertaken between 1997 to 2000 by the SA 
National Roads Agency for the N3 and N4 toll roads, by the Departments of 
Public Works and Correctional Services for two maximum security prisons; by 
two municipalities for water services, and by SA National Parks for tourism 
concessions.  Early lessons drawn from these projects and from international 
practice led to the endorsement of a Strategic Framework for PPPs by Cabinet in 
December 1999; in April 2000, Treasury Regulations for PPPs were first issued 
in terms of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 
(http://www.ppp.gov.za). 
 
In March 2004, the National Treasury published the Standardised PPP 
Provisions, also known as the ‘Standardisation’. The objectives of this 
Standardisation included the following: 
• the promotion of a common understanding of the technical, operational 
and financial risks that are typically encountered in PPPs;  
• a common understanding of how such risks must be transferred or shared 
among the parties involved in the delivery of PPPs; 
• a consistent approach to risk transfer, risk sharing and value for money 
across PPPs falling within the same sector, and  
• a reduction of the time and cost of negotiation of the parties involved in a 
PPP (National Treasury, 2004: 7). 
  
Municipal PPPs are governed in terms of the Municipal Finance Management Act 
(Act 53 of 2003). The regulations governing PPPs became effective in April 2004 
and centre around two key principles: that any agreement between a private 
            16 
party and a municipality must provide value for money and be affordable to the 
municipality.  
 
4. RATIONALE OF CASE STUDY 
 
South Africa is regarded as a leader in the establishment of laws, policies and 
systems for public private partnerships. Our record in providing public service 
through PPPs in recent years has been enhanced, and our PPP project pipeline 
continues to grow, both in numbers and in the innovative value-for-money 
solutions achieved (http://www.ppp.gov.za). 
 
This innovation is evident in the publication of the worlds first PPP Manual by the 
National Treasury. It is a systematic guideline that facilitates public and private 
parties through the phases of the regulated PPP project cycle for all levels of 
government, breaking down policy and providing procedural clarity in the 
process. It combines South African project experience and international best 
practice, without infringing on the jurisdiction of accounting officers and 
authorities. It sets strict risk-assessment standards enabling government to make 
affordable project choices that best leverage private investment for effective and 
efficient public service delivery. More importantly, the PPP Manual contains a 
code that will contribute to the achievement of broad-based black economic 
empowerment in PPPs, not only in the impartiality and management of the 
contracted private parties, but in their subcontracting and in the projects’ local 
socio-economic impacts. Together with the Standardised PPP Provisions, the 
PPP Manual is a powerful means in the ongoing quest to tackle poverty and grow 
the South African economy. The transfer of financial and operating risk to a 
private partner through a PPP provides an affordable, cost-effective answer for 
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4.1 WHAT IS A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP)? 
 
A PPP is a contract between a public sector institution or municipality and a 
private party, in which the private party assumes substantial financial, technical 
and operational risks of a project (National Treasury online: 2010). PPPs brings 
the efficiency of business to public service delivery and as mentioned above, 
avoided the politically controversial aspects of full privatisation. PPPs permits the 
government to retain ownership while binding the private sector to perform a 
specific task such as building, maintaining and operating infrastructure like roads 
and ports, or providing basic services like water and electricity. Both entities 
stand to gain from the contractual agreement. (SAIIA online: 
http://www.saiia.org.za/)    
 
The increased use of PPPs reflect government’s desire to develop and sustain 
close working relationships with the external market and confirms the realisation 
that public authorities and private companies should enter into a partnership for 
the management of safe, regular and reliable public services for its citizens 
(Domberger & Fernandez, 1999: 1).  
 
By bringing in private sector investors who contribute their own capital, skills and 
experience, the public sector profits through commercial discipline, innovation 
and efficiencies. The result is not only increased quality of services, but also 
better value for money. The benchmark for success is therefore whether publicly 
funded services deliver their core purpose. The following key indicators can be 
identified as: 
• Output-based conditions, where services are specified as outputs and 
payment is linked to the quality and timing of their delivery; 
• The long-term contracts that will enable the private sector partner to 
develop different approaches to service delivery, to focus on life-cycle 
costing,  and to recover the initial capital investment; 
• Performance measurement and incentives, which will contribute to 
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securing the value for money proposition promised by the original deal; 
• Competition, which makes it easier to express that value for money has 
been realised, and 
• Private sector organisational skills, distribution of efficiencies and 
innovation in the financing, construction and operation of the total project.  
Two types of PPPs are specifically defined in the South African legislation:  
• where the private party performs an institutional/municipal function, and 
• where the private party acquires the use of state/municipal property for its 
own commercial purposes. A PPP may also be a hybrid of these types 
(http://www.ppp.gov.za). 
The definition clarifies that:  
• A PPP is not a simple outsourcing of task where considerable financial, 
technical and operational risk is preserved by the institution;  
• A PPP is not a bequest by a private party for a public good;  
• A PPP is not the privatisation or releasing of state assets and/or liabilities 
• A PPP is not the creation of a state-owned enterprise  for financial gain, 
and  
• A PPP is not a vehicle for borrowing by the state. 
Payment in any situation entails one of three mechanisms: 
• the institution paying the private party for the delivery of the service, or  
• the private party retrieving fees or charges from users of the service, or  
• a combination of the above  (www.treasury.gov.za). 
 
 
         





















         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Figure 1.1:  A Generic Model of PPP (Source: South African National Treasury) 
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The PPP model in Figure 1.1 is regulated by both the Public Finance 
Management Act (1999) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (2003). 
Currently, the National Treasury has developed a common PPP project life cycle 
for national, provincial and local governments and these PPP regulations guide 
the implementation of PPP projects. This existing model follows the approach 
developed by Grimsey and Lewis in 2004 (www.cib2007.com).  
 
The PPP project cycle is the guide for the PPP process and the Manual. The 
project cycle covers the two most important periods of a PPP: the Preparation 
Period and the Project Term. The PPP Preparation Period covers the Inception, 
Feasibility Study and Procurement phases of the project cycle and concludes 
with the signing of the PPP agreement. The Project Term covers the 
Development, Delivery and Exit phases.   
 
National Treasury’s PPP Manual is primarily concerned with the Project 
Preparation phase.  The PPP project cycle clearly specifies when approvals are 
required and which modules of the PPP Manual are pertinent for the distinct 
phases. The PPP Manual also gives direction on managing a PPP agreement, 












   
 
       
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
Figure 1.2: A Generic PPP Structure (Source: South African National Treasury) 
 
The above assumptions indicate the basic funding composition for projects that 
are funded with limited-recourse obligation, that is, on a project finance basis, 
and are typical for projects that are very capital intensive and therefore involve 
funding sources with relatively modest costs. A project finance funding 
framework, however, will not be suitable for all PPPs. A different funding 
framework may be more suitable in projects which are not exceedingly capital 
intensive such as through capital contributions by institutions and/or other public 
sector bodies (www.treasury.gov.za). 
 
According to Nyagwachi & Smallwood (2008: 4), the Treasury regulations which 
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• Project management proficiency levels required for both the accounting 
officer, institution and officer accountable for implementing the PPP 
project; 
• Selection of the project political champion; 
• Appointment of a PPP project manager; 
• Appointment of an autonomous PPP project auditor; 
• The founding of the project management office and systems, and 
• PPP education and training. 
 
According to Browne, Nemoto, Visser and Whiteing (www.dbsa.org), the three 
fundamental reasons for taking on a PPP are as follows: 
• Efficiency – optimal use of resources through operational competence, 
market-related incentives and rivalry, 
• Integration – Effective convergence of public and private sector 
philosophies will produce benefits to both parties and the public. 
• Accountability – Being able to clearly create PPPs to be accountable for 
their contracted delivery goals. This is normally accomplished by means of 
a process of regulatory oversight, a pre-identified monitoring and review 
process and the use of incentives and disincentives to encourage 
particular objectives in delivery that will provide a robust instrument of 
public accountability. 
 
PPPs are viewed as an effective mechanism accessible to the public sector to 
enhance the provision of public infrastructure and service delivery. It must 
certainly not be viewed as a panacea for all of government’s delivery problems. 
For PPPs to be successful in meeting service delivery objectives, they ought to 
be integrated in an inclusive strategic plan.  They should be implemented in the 
regions where the greatest impact on service delivery is required. Clarity as to 
their role and function within this broader strategic vision is paramount for PPPs 
to be effective (www.dbsa.org). However, the key considerations for the 
construction of any public private partnership remain: 
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• Clarity of the objective of the project. 
• Clarity of the role, responsibilities and input of government. 
• Clarity of the role, responsibilities and input of the private sector. 
• Clarity of the appropriate apportionment of risk. 
Against this background, five usages of PPPs will be discussed. 
4.2 USAGES OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
There are at least five distinctive usages of the term Public-Private Partnerships 
(Kroukamp, 2004: 24-26): 
4.2.1 PPPs AS MANAGEMENT REFORM 
Partnerships as management reform are viewed as an innovative instrument that 
will change the way government operates, largely by leveraging off the discipline 
of the market.  This requires a strong collaborative partnership between public 
and private managers; however, the collaboration reminds one more of a 
mentoring relationship than a cooperative undertaking. If successful, they will 
become increasingly entrepreneurial and adaptable, concentrating more on deal 
making and attracting capital instead of administrative procedures (Gratias & 
Boyd, http://www.cyberus.ca/~ppp/ccmd.html). 
4.2.2 PPPs AS PROBLEM CONVERSION 
PPPs from this standpoint are viewed not as a tool for transforming managerial 
practices, but as a universal fix for most problems regarding to public service 
delivery. Public sector managers refocus on structuring the problems they face in 
a way that will attract profit-seeking associates, thus inducing others to perform 
the tasks of government for less money. Consequently, private companies bring 
their knowledge, expertise and capital, while government eases the regulatory 
and tax burdens. The idea is therefore not to alter the public service ethic, or to 
revolutionise the way managers manage (Linder, 1999: 44).  
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4.2.3 PPPs AS MORAL REGENERATION 
While the above perspectives depict partnerships as a medium for bringing 
government closer to the private sector, a more subtle distinction becomes 
noticeable when one reflects on the effects that partnerships have on the 
personnel involved. Inherent are features of government’s obligation  that convey 
official sanction, entitlement or worth, as opposed to issues mediated by money. 
This has a salutary moral effect on them. Incentives such as patriotism, self-
reliance, initiative integrity and prudence, the so-called non-monetary incentives, 
can reinforce their character, and arouse their creative problem-solving skills 
(Bourgault & Gusella, 2000: 4). 
4.2.4 PPPs AS RISK SHIFTING 
The use of partnerships for risk shifting depicts partnering as a way of 
responding to monetary stringency on the part of government. Government’s 
intention is to obtain private interests with the promise of profit potential, thus 
private investors accept the financial risks of ownership when the projects are 
complete. In effect, government is exhorted to do more with less.  
4.2.5 PPPs AS POWER SHARING 
Partnerships as power sharing can change business-government collaboration in 
fundamental ways. Firstly, a culture of cooperation and trust is substituted for an 
adversarial relationship endemic to command-and-control regulation. Secondly, 
most relationships between partners involve some mutually beneficial allotment 
of responsibility, knowledge or risk. In nearly all instances, each party contributes 
something of significance to be invested or exchanged. Thirdly, there is an 
anticipation of give-and-take among the partners, negotiating differences that 
were otherwise dealt with through legal avenues. Through power sharing, 
regulations can be made less rigid, leading to, inter alia, cost savings and 
technical assistance.  
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4.3 BENEFITS OF PPPs 
• They are seen as "value for money" rather than reductions in debt. 
• They are considered a contributor to growth, expansion and service 
delivery and as a vehicle to enhance local investment. 
• They are viewed as a fundamental mechanism accessible to the public 
sector to improve the delivery of public infrastructure and services. 
• They provide a formidable mechanism by making available facilities which 
continue in the public interest. 
• The private sector is likely to be more innovative in the use and 
management of assets than the public sector and this reduces the cost 
requirement and increases competition. 
• Infrastructural specification and construction is more efficient compared to 
the public sector. 
• Advancing the completion of high priority projects by procuring services 
using innovative methods.  
• The private sector provides greater benefits regarding the provision of 
specialised management know-how especially where large and complex 
programmes are concerned.  
• They enable the delivery of innovative technology developed by private 
entities. 
• They allow for the reduction in the size of public agencies and the 
substitution of private sector resources and personnel. 
• PPPs have far-reaching broad-based BEE potential, creating an increased 
demand for black professionals as business advisors to both institutions 
and private parties in PPPs. 
• Return on equity to the private party is competitive where risk is properly 
assumed. 
• PPPs create jobs (www.dbsa.org). 
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4.4 DISADVANTAGES OF PPPs 
 
• PPPs with inadequate business experience invariably increase the risk 
profile and lead to a fear of the unknown. 
• Public sector entities lack fall short of the skills needed to manage PPPs, 
and public officials are prone to resist private sector involvement in 
trepidation surrounding loss of control, possible staff reduction or potential 
risk of failure. 
• A lack of vision can lead to PPPs failing to meet the required service 
delivery standards. 
• The PPP mode may not be appropriate for all delivery purposes and 
private entity involvement may be included in other delivery modes without 
necessarily needing a full-scale inclusive buy-out initiative. 
• The reputation of PPPs and the concomitant delivery process are viewed 
in a bad light as in most instances PPPs raise tariffs to meet bigger 
spending needs for infrastructure and delivery services, notwithstanding a 
larger customer base and the fact that the customer will benefit from more 
efficient services (www.dbsa.org). 
 
5. GENERAL CHALLENGES 
 
PPPs have become an established collaboration between both public and private 
entities. Some of the common lessons emerging out of the partnership are listed 
below: 
 
• There is no certainty regarding the time it takes to establish the 
partnership and yield results, if any. 
• Objectives envisioned by policy-makers via the partnership must be 
clear and attainable. Misdirected objectives lead to wastage.  
• Exploitation of the usual efficiency gains, proficiency and technology is 
paramount when developing the PPP model. 
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• It is critical that appropriate incentivised delivery schemes for the 
private sector are outlined in the contract right from the beginning. 
• The PPP, being essentially a business collaboration, is also a learning 
process. Failure of some PPPs is unavoidable (www.dbsa.org). 
 
6. ECONOMIC CORRIDORS 
 
Gauteng is the economic hub of South Africa specifically and Africa in general. 
To achieve growth strategy, South Africa’s most logical and practical solution is 
to prioritise transport corridors.  Of South Africa's current fourteen corridors, five 
key corridors have been identified as the focus for immediate attention and 
investment. These five carry eighty percent of the freight to South Africa’s ports 
and harbours. They are the KwaZulu-Natal Corridor, Richards Bay Corridor, 
Sishen-Saldanha Corridor, Western Cape Corridor and the Ngqura Corridor near 
Port Elizabeth (The Freelibrary Online, 2010). Even though transport corridors 
have existed for centuries, only in the preceding decades has their intrinsic value 
been acknowledged and, more importantly, the potential and value they can add 
in terms of economic growth as a mode of delivery and communication. 
 
The three main economic corridors for Durban are: 
• The Gauteng-Durban Corridor, including Johannesburg City Deep, 
Harrismith Hub and Durban Dube Trade Port. 
• The Richards Bay Corridor, which stretches from Durban to the North 
Coast of KZN. 
• The South Coast Corridor, which stretches from Durban to the Eastern 
Cape. 
“Durban has become the de facto coastal 'gateway' to Southern Africa and 
Africa,” said Professor Bonke Dumisa, Chief Executive of the Durban Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. “It is the major port city on the African continent and is 
ideally located to access the international shipping routes between East and 
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West” (http://sharondavis.co.za).  The Port of Durban is a bustling hub of 
economic activity and the biggest of South Africa's seven harbours. It manages in 
excess of 31.4 million tons of cargo per annum, with a value surpassing R100 
billion per annum, which is approximately 65 percent of the value of all cargo 
passing through South African ports. In excess of R3 billion has been reserved 
for investment in Durban Port's infrastructure since 2002 for expansion and 
development, which includes broadening the harbour mouth and the building of 
cargo terminals (http://sharondavis.co.za).  
Durban, the southern hemisphere’s busiest port, is intended to become one of 
the world's largest container hubbing harbours. Globally, in marine terms, Durban 
is the heart of the southern hemisphere's maritime universe (Tom, 2009: 26). 
Given its commercial importance to important markets such as China, India, the 
Americas and Europe, Transnet, the para-statal that owns the harbour, is 
investing large sums of money to expand capacity, upgrade and promote the port 
not only as a key destination but for trans-shipment purposes. 
7. DURBAN METROPOLITAN POLICE PPP AND THE CHALLENGES 
FACED 
The International Labour Organisation estimated in 1995, that globally, more than 
100 million people were working in state-owned enterprises, a number of which 
were in the process of evolving into PPPs. The report observed that while 
employers as well as policy legislators have been persuaded of the potential 
benefits from PPPs, trade unions have been primarily concerned about the 
erosion of job security and acquired constitutional rights (www.mbendi.co.za).  
Unlike the private sector, public sector labour unions in South Africa are more 
vociferous in their approach. They tend to play a more participative and 
sometimes aggressive role than their private sector counterparts. Two major 
unions dominate the labour environment within the Durban Metropolitan Police 
Service. They are the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and the 
Integrated Municipal Trade Union (IMATU). Membership within the Durban 
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Metropolitan Police Service is virtually split between these two unions. SAMWU 
and IMATU are considered major role-players within the eThekwini Council’s 
policy-making and implementation process. 
 
SAMWU, who are aligned with the ANC’s tripartite political partner, Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU), have long been opposed in principle to 
private sector involvement because they fear that restructuring will, inter alia, 
threaten their interests and the workers’ conditions of employment. The unions 
have expressed concern that their members may lose employment, have to be 
re-deployed somewhere else within the public service, transferred to a new 
company, lose job prospects and/or be subjected to different work processes. In 
addition, unions have also raised reservations about the future of their 
negotiating rights, their rights to representation in the work place in dealings with 
the private organisations and in wage negotiations. The alleged impact of PPPs 
on job security and to a lesser degree on bargaining rights, has increased 
opposition to PPPs (www.mbendi.co.za). 
 
8. OPERATION  OF  THE  DURBAN  METROPOLITAN  POLICE 
WEIGHBRIDGE  PPP 
 
Law enforcement ought to have, inter alia, the effect of reducing, eliminating, 
and/or providing alternatives to a criminal problem or issue. The scrutinisation 
and enforcement of errant freight vehicles on Durban’s main roads and especially 
through its main economic corridors, is necessary for the following reasons: 
• Primarily to provide a safe and secure environment for all road users; 
• To prevent road damage and consequent loss to other road users, and 
• To ensure minimal inconvenience by facilitating free traffic flow. 
 
Historically, weighing of heavy vehicles in the Durban central hub has been the 
sole domain of the KZN Provincial Road Traffic Inspectorate (KZNRTI), as it was 
the only organisation that owned and operated weighing facilities. In order not to 
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duplicate patrolling services within the Durban Metropolitan area, the KZNRTI 
patrols all of the national and main routes bordering the Durban Metropolitan 
area, while the Durban Metropolitan Police Service concentrates on the national, 
main and secondary routes within its area of jurisdiction. It must be noted that the 
KZNRTI has full jurisdictional authority over the entire KZN province, including 
the Durban Metropolitan area.  
 
The DMPS forms one of the Emergency Service units within the eThekwini 
Metropolitan Council. Bayhead Road is a secondary road within the Durban 
Metropolitan area, and more importantly is a key point of entry and exit for all 
freight vehicles entering and leaving the Durban Harbour. The road has received 
numerous small upgrades over the years but since 2009, vehicular flow has been 
greatly increased with the completion of the Khangela Bridge that facilitates 
traffic across the M4 Freeway more rapidly.  
 
Until November 2000, the DMPS enforced weighing offences by escorting freight 
vehicles to the Umbilo KZNRTI facilities (outside Clairwood) for weighing. This 
placed added pressure on the capacity of the existing facility and became a 
source of frustration to DMPS officers. The eThekwini Municipality entered into a 
joint venture with Vululeka-TMT Consortium, a private organisation specialising 
in weighbridge manning and management systems and built a dedicated 
weighbridge on Bayhead Road which opened for business in November 2000.  
 
The facility operated on a three shift, 24 hour basis and comprised 4 full-time 
Consortium staff per shift responsible for the administration of the weighbridge, 
and 6 full time police officers per shift responsible for all legislated enforcement 
activities. A roving supervisor was responsible for the Consortium staff and a 
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The DMPS responsibilities included: 
• Identifying suspected errant vehicles; 
• Pulling the vehicles over for inspection and weighing; 
• Scrutinising the driver and his/her official documents such as drivers 
licence, professional driving permit, freight documentation, and 
• Enforcement of any offences ascertained. 
The Consortium’s responsibilities included: 
• Operating the weighing equipment; 
• Ensuring that all the weighbridge equipment and facilities, including the 
communication control centre, were in working order; 
• Coordinating all documentation pertaining to administration and 
enforcement, and 
• Compilation of statistical and administrative reports. 
 
Therefore, in effect, all of the administrative tasks amounting to approximately 
50% of the weighbridge operational functions were conducted by the Consortium 
personnel, thus releasing more policing officials into the enforcement arena. 
However, this was not necessarily for weighbridge duties but elsewhere in the 
precinct.  
 
For the personnel of both PPP parties, these were new functions, resulting in a 
constant need for training and development. This was attributed to the relatively 
short exposure period to staffing qualities of job skills, focussed commitment, 
meeting performance parameters, and motivation. Both PPP partners were 
actively involved in identifying and conducting the necessary training intervention 
which was attended to jointly. One of the advantages of a joint training session 
was that personnel from both sides were exposed to a holistic view of the 
operation. This prevented confusion and overlapping of functions.  
 
In terms of assuring efficiency, the Consortium was given strict performance 
parameters, the achievement of which would regulate their fee payment. Failure 
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to achieve the stipulated minimum standards of performance would also result in 
the termination of the contract. Therefore, contractual and job preservation would 
ensure the continued motivation of the Consortium personnel.  
 
The combined efficiency also led to a sustained enforcement track. Whereas in a 
fully policed function, police personnel were prone to lapses in work ethos, the 
presence of private individuals who were tied to a performance parameter 
amongst them, ensured policing continuity. All activities were logged or recorded 
in the control centre; therefore, lapsed time and its explanation had to be logged 
with a corresponding explanation. For example, if the police personnel took an 
unauthorised extended lunch interval which caused the Consortium personnel to 
wait idly, such idleness was logged and the errant officers asked to forward an 
explanation.  
 
Abuse of police vehicles is particularly prevalent due to a lack of effective control 
mechanisms. Combined efficiency also ensured that such abuse was curtailed by 
the logging of all activities within the weighbridge premises.  
A further advantage of combined efficiency was the reduced potential for bribery 
and other illegal activities. Most private sector employment contracts stipulate 
immediate dismissal for dishonesty. Where dishonesty or bribery is suspected, 
even as circumstantial evidence, private sector companies can give the 
employee, at their discretion, an option to resign immediately in exchange for no 
prosecution. The end result is that the employee ultimately loses his/her job. As 
mentioned previously, the process of dismissal in the public sector is far more 
complex due to the strength of the labour unions.  
 
This committed effort in overloading enforcement by dedicated officers trained 
specifically on the subject of freight abuse, resulted in expert evidence given in 
court and a sudden trend of extremely high fines being levied. The trend of high 
fines being levied by the courts quickly spread to other regions in KZN and as far 
as the Free State, resulting in a decrease in the number of vehicles prosecuted.  
            33 
Comparison of vehicle weighing statistics: 2000 to 2002 
 




No. of vehicles weighed 138 367 147 113 187 961 +28 
No. of vehicles 
overloaded 46 883 42 291 47 961 +13 
Percentage overloaded 34 29 26 -3 
No of vehicles charged 18 117 12 496 10 386 -17 
Percentage charged 13 8 6 -2 
Table 1.1 Comparison statistics adapted from KZN Transport Annual Report 
2003 
 
Table 1.1 illustrates a decreasing trend in the number of vehicles weighed in the 
province of KZN from 13% to 6%, a positive difference of 7%.  
 
In 2005, the eThekwini Municipality did not renew its PPP contract with Vululeka-
TMT Consortium and the DMPS assumed full control of the weighbridge. All of 
the replacement staff consisted of active policemen; additional resources such as 
police vehicles and two-way radios were required.  
 
Below are the statistics of prosecutions levied at the Bayhead Weighbridge for 
the year 2003 during the PPP period. 
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Figure 1.3: Monthly offences levied against freight vehicles in 2003 
 
Figure 1.3 indicates the number of offences per month levied against freight 
vehicles from January to December 2003. These totals include both weight 
related and non-weight related offences, such as defects and moving offences. 
Examples of defect offences are defective lamps, tyres or windscreen wipers. 
Examples of moving offences are the use of a cellular phone while driving, and 
failure to indicate.  
 
The average number of offences per month was 505 and the months from May to 
October recorded an above average number of charges levied. The reasons for 
this are as follows: 
• The first quarter of the New Year is generally a low economic period. 
• As the high demand periods such as Christmas and year end 
approaches, an increase in freight vehicular traffic is recorded.  
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Figure 1.4: Weight related offences levied against freight vehicles in 2003 
 
There were a total of 2375 charges levied in respect of weight related offences 
for the year 2003, equating to an average of 198 offences per month. Unlike 
Figure 1.3, this average was spread over a 9 month period from February to 
October, excluding the month of April which has many public holidays including 
Easter. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 do, however, indicate similar trends in terms of low 
and high demand periods.  
 






Jan 170 329 52% 
Feb 202 436 46% 
Mar 200 479 42% 
Apr 134 328 41% 
May 208 743 28% 
Jun 213 794 27% 
Jul 305 613 50% 
Aug 301 608 50% 
Sep 341 875 39% 
Oct 250 594 42% 
Nov 40 228 18% 
Dec 11 32 34% 
Total 2375 6059 39% 
Table 1.2: Comparative totals for 2003 
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According to Table 1.2, there were 6059 offences recorded, of which 2375 or 
39% were weight related. 
 
The following statistics pertain to the period after the termination of the Vululeka-
TMT Consortium PPP contract. It must be noted that upon termination of the 
contract, the entire Bayhead Weighbridge operation was run by DMPS uniformed 
officers and a different operational strategy was used. These included shift and 
personnel changes. Every officer worked a four day/four night/four day off shift 
cycle, necessitating extra officers for its effective operation. Figures indicate that 
the number of officers committed to the area had increased three-fold while the 
supervisor received no additional assistance. As a result, enforcement officers 
with no proper training in the operation of the weighbridge equipment were 
transferred into the unit, some against their will. A de-motivated and untrained 
officer is more counterproductive to the unit. The following statistics are cited for 
comparative reasons.  
 




























Figure 1.5: Monthly offences against freight vehicles in 2008 
 
Figure 1.5 indicates the number of offences per month levied against freight 
vehicles for the period January to December 2008. These totals include both 
weight related and non-weight related offences. The above graph is in direct 
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contrast to the corresponding graph for 2003, with the peak for 2008 in May, and 
the peak for 2003 in September. The reason for this can be seen in Figure 1.6 
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Figure 1.6: Weight related offences levied against freight vehicles in 2008 
 
The trend for both Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 is similar from the month of April. 
The drastic drop in March in Figure 1.6 as compared to Figure 1.5 was due to an 
operational shutdown at the weighbridge station. 
 






Jan 269 1036 26% 
Feb 251 1304 19% 
Mar 16 1111 1% 
Apr 313 1178 27% 
May 457 1398 33% 
Jun 380 1222 31% 
Jul 286 843 34% 
Aug 368 997 37% 
Sep 179 528 34% 
Oct 109 351 31% 
Nov 171 557 31% 
Dec 98 338 29% 
Total 2897 10863 27% 
Table 1.3: Comparative totals for 2008 
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The effect of the increase in enforcement officers post the PPP, resulted in a 
44% increase in offences levied However, it is clear that more emphasis was 
placed on defect and moving offences as opposed to weight related offences. It 
is more convenient for an enforcement officer to levy a defect or moving offence 
charge, especially on a freight vehicle, as opposed to him or her stopping and 
enforcing a weight related offence, which is also time consuming. Table 1.2 
compared to Table 1.3 indicates a drop of 12% for average weight related 
offences levied. 
 
It could be argued that a trend of continuous enforcement could be the cause of 
the drop in freight related offences; however, the counter argument would be that 
a similar trend ought to be seen with the defect and moving offences category, as 
it would not make sense for freight companies to comply with the weight aspect 
and still risk time and financial loss through defect offence related delays.  
The drop in weight related offences is also attributable to a lack of accountability 
that the existence of the PPP brought about. Even supervisory personnel had 




The enormous challenges inherited by a young and inexperienced South African 
democracy in 1994 during a period of global economic volatility, asked for rapid 
strategic solutions such as switching from an ideologically socialist RDP to the 
capitalist GEAR policy. This was necessary in achieving its major goals of social 
equilibrium through reconstruction and development, national reconciliation and 
nation building, community empowerment, and democratic involvement.  
 
Whilst the national PPP strategy was necessary notwithstanding its detractors, it 
is still unclear how effective PPPs are. What is certain is its value in alleviating 
the historical crisis of underfunding in road infrastructure, and to this end it can 
be said that the DMPS model was successful. The existence of two independent 
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parties working side by side towards a common goal engendered a culture of 
accountability, which resulted in an increase in weight related offences through 
the use of properly trained enforcement and civilian personnel, and a drop in 
corrupt activities. One can only surmise that its sudden termination was as a 
result of a political decision and certainly not through operational inefficiency, as 
can be seen in the comparative data above.  
 
Specifically targeted offenders such as freight carriers suited the PPP model and 
its operational format demonstrated various advantages through combined 
efficiencies. Of particular relevance is the reduction of corruption and abuse of 
state resources, and an increase in efficiency. Overall, statistics also revealed a 
drop in prosecution and an inevitable increase in offenders once the PPP 
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